DECENTRALIZATION IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REALITY

Abstract

The Democratic Republic of Congo‟s (DRC) 2006 Constitution enshrined ambitious decentralization provisions– creating 26 provinces, elected local assemblies, and mandating that provinces retain 40% of domestic revenues – as a break from decades of centralization under Mobutu Sese Seko. This paper seeks to examine why have these formal decentralization provisions largely failed in practice? The qualitative, document-based policy analysis of publicly available official sources (World Bank, IMF, IGC, UN, etc.), reveals that the constitutional-legal framework has been undermined by weak administrative capacity, political resistance from the center, and inability to enforce constitutional mandates. Further, insufficient institutional capacity and deliberate political obstruction by central elites have produced a persistent gap between law and practice. Effective decentralisation requires substantive legal and fiscal reforms coupled with capacity building and people‟s empowerment to ensure that people are brought back in democracy and governance became citizen centric. This is fundamental to societal transformation , substantive democracy and sustainable development.