Examining the psychological underpinnings of Chernobyl and after

Abstract

 A safety test in Reactor No. 4 at the Vladimir Lenin Power Plant near Pripyat, Ukraine, in the early hours of 26 April, 1986, led to one of the worst nuclear disasters in history. The ensuing events included attempts to control the information available regarding the explosion. The current study analyses the accident at Chernobyl in light of the psychological factors that played a role in causing it, and in the aftermath. The material analysed includes a report on an international conference (IAEA) where the incident was discussed at length, an interview with Valery Legasov, a key person in the dealing of the aftermath, and tape recordings left by him before his death, and a journalistic article on the concealment mechanisms employed by the State. The method of analysis was thematic analysis, and the key points that emerged are secrecy, obedience, power dynamics, avoidance of panic, and various patterns of information dissemination. The themes show how a pattern of concealment and emphasis on fixed roles and hierarchy may have played a role in causing the incident at Chernobyl, and how the fallout was navigated. The study shows the role of psychological factors in the functioning of institutions, when dealing with disasters and emergencies, including decision-making, risk management, information management, and international relations.